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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines dynamics in public good accessibility and cross-community inequality in Indonesia, 
using village-level panel data from 2000 to 2006 from their decentralized public-good allocation system. 
The introduction of decentralization makes public-good investment dependent on initial local income and 
endowment, and makes it difficult to coordinate investment decisions across communities. Our analysis 
also shows that possible strategic interactions among communities connected with transportation 
infrastructure (externalities) implies spatial divergence. Empirical evidence on education and heath 
facilities, however, demonstrates that during the decentralized period, (1) accessibility to school has 
improved and school investments were effectively coordinated over space; (2) hospital access has 
improved only marginally; but (3) per-capita availability of schools and local medical clinics (puskesmas) 
in the community shows convergence toward low-level equilibria. Despite the coordination in spatial 
allocation even in the decentralization period (observed in intervillage accessibility), endogenous 
population mobility and growth partially cancel the benefits of the coordinated efforts in public-good 
allocation. This point requires further policy attention.  
Keywords: public goods, education, health, spatial coordination, poverty dynamics, Indonesia 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The devolution of political decisionmaking to local governments and communities—so-called 
decentralization—has been promoted in the area of infrastructure investment. Development aid agencies 
such as the World Bank also tend to encourage this experimental transition of political power from central 
governments to local entities in many developing countries (World Bank 2000). In a decentralized 
regime, local governments and communities are expected to work together to manage their resources and 
decide the budget allocation. In this simplified picture, well-endowed communities often use their 
resources well and thus achieve more investment in local public goods, while resource-poor communities 
have difficulty raising enough funds to invest in local public goods and may thus remain stagnant. For 
this reason making investment capability dependent on local income and endowments can potentially 
increase intercommunity inequality.  
The issue of coordination failure is potentially important in both centralized and decentralized 
regimes. First, if small communities decide to investment in public goods independently, it would be 
difficult for a group of them to coordinate their projects. Second, in reality, both local communities and 
governments are often involved in the decisions on local public-good investments and allocation. Even if 
the local government tries to coordinate communities’ investments across all the communities in their 
jurisdiction, it is not guaranteed that the investments will be well coordinated to equalize the accessibility 
and availability of public goods. Third, the central government also allocates budgets to local 
governments, who coordinate public-good investments in their regions. For example, in Indonesia, 
villages propose investment project plans to their district, which select good projects and allocate to them 
not only district but also central government funds that the district has received.  
Local coordination becomes especially important in the presence of externalities. For example, 
since children often commute to schools outside their village, the spatial allocation of schools across 
villages will be crucial in ensuring accessibility to education. In other words, children can benefit from 
schools investments in other villages. In this paper, we examine the spatial coordination and allocation 
issues of public goods such as schools and health facilities in a decentralized regime, using village-census 
panel data from Indonesia. 
In Indonesia, the responsibility for much of government expenditure was decentralized to district 
governments through fiscal and political decentralization. Two cornerstones of Indonesian 
decentralization are Law 22/1999 on governance and Law 25/1999 on fiscal relations. Law 22 devolves 
all governance functions from the center to the regions with the exception of national defence, 
international relations, justice, police, monetary policy, development planning, religion, and finance. It 
makes local governments responsible for the provision of health, education, and environmental and   2
infrastructure services. Local governments can also perform any other function not explicitly reserved for 
the center (Hofman and Kaiser 2006). 
Similar to the law on governance, Law 25 on fiscal relations has significantly strengthened local 
governments’ share in government spending. For example, regional governments’ expenditure as a share 
of overall public expenditure increased from about 17 percent in 2000 to more than 30 percent after 2001. 
In addition, decentralization also reassigned some two-thirds of central civil servants to regional 
governments, and regional governments now employ more than three-quarters of civil servants (Hofman 
and Kaiser 2006). 
Following the decentralization decision, the central government quickly delegated virtually 
complete responsibility for urban and rural infrastructure services to local governments (Peterson and 
Muzzini 2005). The transition was implemented in 2001. In 2002, local governments financed 44.3 
percent of transportation development, 21 percent of health and social services, and 16 percent of 
education development (Eckardt and Shah 2006). Today, even though the central government distributes 
grant subsidies to local governments, fiscal equalization remains incomplete in large part because the 
equalization formula is still driven by historical allocations, including wages, and local governments are 
subject to significant disparities in per capita expenditures (Hofman and Kaiser 2006). 
This experiment in Indonesia is unique in two ways. First, the change happened very quickly and 
applies to a large area. It was in fact imposed on the majority of local communities from above, and they 
did not have time to prepare for the change before it happened. 
Second, local conditions across the country vary greatly, including access to and availability of 
local public goods. We would therefore expect various responses to decentralization at the community 
level. For these two reasons, Indonesia gives us a suitable empirical setting in which to investigate how 
diverse local initial conditions affect the potential to grow during the decentralization period. 
Indonesia also provides an invaluable village-census database, which helps us to understand 
village-level dynamics of public goods such as public education and health facilities. For our research 
purposes, the village is an appropriate unit of observation since it is the basic unit of consensus-building. 
Villagers, coordinated by the village office (head), approach local governments at the kecamatan 
(subdistrict) and kabupaten (district) level for funding for their projects. We construct panel data from the 
village census during the decentralization regime to examine possible changes in the way that public-good 
investments were determined (see Section 4). 
The earlier literature on decentralization started with the seminal work of Tiebout (1956), where 
voter-citizens move costlessly among jurisdictions and chose from them. Tiebout focused on whether a 
set of competing jurisdictions would provide an efficient allocation of public goods. As we will see, the 
Indonesian evidence partly supports the Tiebout-style “voting with your feet” argument. One of the   3
omissions of Tiebout’s work was that he did not consider “spillovers,” which was remedied in Oates 
(1972). Under an assumption of uniform expenditure, Oates (1972) finds that decentralization is 
preferable over centralized provision with heterogeneous tastes and no spillovers since local governments 
can tailor local public goods to local tastes. However, with spillovers and no taste heterogeneity, 
centralized provision is more efficient. 
Recent literature on decentralization has taken two directions. The first studies examine 
theoretically the various aspects of decentralization impacts, such as the emergence of local elites 
capturing the bulk of the benefits and the improvements in project efficiency and accountability (see, for 
example, Bardhan 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000). Second, empirical studies have also emerged 
recently that assess both the effect of decentralization and democratization on both public-good 
investment behavior (see, for example, Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001) and 
students’ academic achievement where vouchers have been introduced (Angrist et al. 2002). The main 
interest in the literature is to know the effect of heterogeneous population preferences on local 
decisionmaking for public investments.
1 We investigate this issue in detail in another paper (Chowdhury, 
Yamauchi, and Dewina 2007). 
Unlike the above papers, we are interested in cross-community (spatial) inequality and the 
poverty trap. To our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to assess dynamic implications for 
inequality, divergence, and convergence across communities. Our main conjecture is that, even if 
decentralization can improve accountability and efficiency in public-good investment and management, it 
can also increase cross-community inequality if the government and/or local communities do not 
coordinate their efforts. This coordination is especially desirable where public goods have externalities 
across communities. This concern poses a serious question about equity, as investment capacity crucially 
depends on local income and endowment through the decentralization process. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up a simple model of local 
decisionmaking on public goods in both decentralized and centralized regimes. We next show that 
transportation externalities (road development) across communities introduce strategic interactions among 
communities. The main implication is that decentralization can potentially increase intercommunity 
inequality because of the failure of communities to coordinate their decisionmaking, whereas the central 
government is expected to equalize public-good allocation across communities. 
Section 3 discusses our empirical approach. We use nonparametric estimation of public-good 
dynamics, which can flexibly depict possibilities of convergence and divergence processes. Section 4 
describes our data and the method we used to construct village-level panel data. 
                                                 
1 Miguel and Gugerty (2005) investigated the effects of ethnic diversity on local public good management. Ethnic diversity 
leads to collective action failures by making it diffcult to impose social sanctions.   4
Section 5 shows our empirical results on dynamics in the availability and accessibility of school 
and health facilities. We observe an interesting similarity between the two types of local public-good 
dynamics. We show that communities are converging in a situation in which they have more equal access 
to primary, junior, and senior school. This trend is slightly weaker in the spatial allocation of hospitals. 
However, the dynamics of facility availability indicates convergence to low-level equilibria. These two 
observations can be explained by endogenous population mobility and growth. People move to locations 
with more per-capita facilities, although new investments are effectively coordinated over space to 
improve accessibility during the decentralization period. Section 6 shows some evidence that population 
growth—including both natural and through mobility—is higher in locations with higher per-capita 
numbers of school and health facilities at the initial stage.   5
2.  MODEL 
2.1 Basic Setting 
This section sets up the environment in which the community decides public-good investment and 
allocation. Assume for simplicity that there is one public good. We also assume that the community 
allocates its resources into consumption and investment and has returns (service) from the public-good 
investment. For simplicity, assume there is no subsidy from the central government.  
The community taxes the residents to raise funds for building the public good. The tax rate is 
assumed to be unique within the community, and residents have to decide through some mechanism what 
the rate should be. Before discussing the mechanism, let us describe the individual decision problem. 
Assume a nondegenerate income distribution in the community. Income yi is given to individual i. With 
tax rate t, the per-capita public good q is formed through q = tE(y) if q ≥ g (or  ()
g
Ey t ≥ ) where E(y) is the 
average community income, which is exogenous to each individual in the community, and g is the 
minimum sufficient level of the public good. Assume that q = 0 if tE(y) < g. Meanwhile, we assume that 
the above condition holds. We write the utility for a household as 
  ()( ( 1 ) ) ( ) ii Vty u ty fq β ; =− + , 
where u(.) and f(.) are utility functions for the consumption and public-good service, respectively, and β is 
the discount factor (β∈(0,1)). Assume that both utility functions are strictly increasing and concave. Since 
the problem is single-peaked, the first order condition for agent i,  () () () ii ucy Eyf q β
′′ = , provides the 












′ = =.  
The relative income position affects the individually most-preferred tax rate. Let t(yi) denote the 
tax rate, that is t(yi) ≡ argmaxV(t;yi). Given the nondegenerate income distribution, we also have a 
nondegenerate distribution of the most preferred tax rate. The community uses majority voting to decide 
the community’s tax rate. By median voter theorem, the tax rate t
* is equal to 
()a r g m a x ( )
mm ty Vty =; , 
where y
m is the median income in the community. In this autarchy case, since community-income level 
(median, taking into account the distribution) affects investment in public good, the distribution of the   6
community median-income (across communities) will generate the distribution of public-good 
investment.  
Proposition 1 
(i) Investment in public good depends on community income level 
(ii) Cross-community income distribution generates the distribution (inequality) of public-good 
investment across communities. 
2.2 Multiple Communities 
In this section, we open transportation to neighboring communities. We assume N communities. Let q-k 
denote per-capita public good in the other community. Individuals have access to public good in the 
neighboring community. Accessibility to public good outside one’s own community is measured by 
δ ∈ (0,1), and δ q-k is the good (or service) accessible for them. Our problem becomes 
() ( ( 1 ) ) ( ) ik i k k Vtyq u ty fq q β δ −− ;, = − + + . 
In the above, we assume that public good (service) in one’s own community is substitutable to 
that in the other community. This setting creates a free-rider incentive, which leads to underinvestment. 
Individuals in the community take public good (service) in the other community as exogenous to them. 
By median voter theorem, the community’s tax rate is  ()
m
kk ty q − ; . Therefore, 
() ( ) ( )
m
kk k k qq Ey ty q −− = ,,  
which is the community’s reaction function to q-k. The function q(q-k) is negatively sloped, and the slope 
depends on accessibility parameter δ. The larger δ is, the greater the free-riding incentive is. Thus, the 
function becomes more negatively sloped.   7
The Nash equilibrium is defined as () kk qq
∗∗
− ,  or () kk tt
∗ ′∗
− , , from which both communities have no 
incentive to deviate. The intersection of the two reaction functions defines the equilibrium: 
() ( ) ( () )
m
kk k k k qq q E y t y q q
∗∗ ∗
− == , .
2 
Proposition 2 
i) In the presence of cross-community transportation (δ > 0), public good in neighboring communities 
reduces the incentive to invest in public good (free-riding incentive). 
(ii) An increase in δ decreases the incentive to invest, which implies divergence in public goods. 
(iii) Income inequality across communities generates divergence in public goods. 
There are a few remarks on the equilibrium. First, without interdependence between the 
communities, we confirm again that a higher average (median) community income implies more public 
good (by a higher tax rate). This creates a wider income inequality between the communities than the 
central government case (see the next section). 
Second, a higher income in the neighboring communities implies a lower incentive to invest 
because of a free-riding incentive. In other words, the community invests more in public goods if the 
adjacent community is poor. The interdependence creates a potential free-rider problem. When all 
communities in a region are poor (cannot afford to invest enough in public good), they are likely to be in 
a poverty trap, as in the autarchy case. 
Third, compared to the autarchy case, we have welfare improvement in the two community cases 
due to cross-community spillovers. Both communities can save investment in the first period. Thus, 
opening a road and improving accessibility to the other community will improve the total welfare in both 
communities. 
2.3 Social Planner: Central and Local Governments 
In this section we examine the implications in the case where the central or local government taxes 
income and allocates public goods in communities mutually connected through transportation. Assume 
                                                 
2 Suppose that q
1 and q
2 are two different public goods. Utility from these services in each community is summarized as 
12 ()
jj
k j k f qq δ ′ =, + ∑ . Budget allocation is 
12 ()
kk k qqt E y += . Reaction function for tax is 
12 ()
m
k kk ty q q ′′ ;, . This setting creates 
the possibility of coordination between the two communities if δ is sufficiently large. Since marginal returns from the service are 
assumed to be the same in the two public goods, they have an incentive to equalize the marginal returns from these goods.  
However, the minimum sufficiency condition imposes that tE(yk) ≥ 2g in both communities if they invest in both. In some 
income range, it is easy to show that 
12 (0) ( )
m
kk k k qt y q E y ′ =; ,  and 
21 (0 ) ( )
m
k kk k qt y qE y ′′ ′ =; ,  are Nash equilibrium. Multiplicity 
of public goods with spatial substitutability may generate the multiplicity of equilibria: poverty-trap and coordination equilibria if 
the minimum investment requirement for the multiple goods cannot be met singly in each community.   8
that the government can tax communities differently and allocate different amounts of public good to 
communities. Define the resource constraint as 
ki k k k ki k ty n q = ∑ ∑∑, 
where superscript k denotes community and nk is community k’s population. Assume n = nk for all k. 
The government maximizes the sum of utilities in N communities: 
11
max ((1 ) ) ( )
NN
ki k k k
ki k
ut y n f qq βδ −
==
−+ + ∑∑ ∑ , 







= ∑ ∑∑ . 
The first order conditions for tk and qk are, respectively, 
() 0






nf q q nf q q n
λ











for all k. The latter set of conditions gives q
* for all k. Therefore, the government guarantees equal access 















for all k. The weighted average of marginal utilities (with relative income as a weight) is equalized 
between the two communities. This condition implies that the government taxes rich communities more 
(that is, the government can also distribute subsidies to communities if a unique tax rate is imposed on all 
communities).   9
Proposition 3 
(i) Under centralization, the government progressively taxes communities and allocates public goods 
equally across communities. 
(ii) Local spillovers (q substitution through transportation) do not change the above result, although it 
affects investment level. 
We have some remarks. First, with centralization, the allocation of public goods is equalized 
across communities. In the process of decentralization, however, the income inequality across 
communities generates the inequality in public good investment. Depending on how public goods are 
related across neighboring communities (substitutable or complementary), the income and endowment 
levels of neighboring communities have a negative or positive effect on the incentive to invest in public 
good. The latter case may induce spatial poverty traps. 
Second, spatial correlation has implications on local inequality and dynamics of public 
investment. For example, negative spatial correlation increases local inequality in the availability of 
public good. This factor does not necessarily increase local inequality in accessibility because in this 
situation, they can easily access public goods in other communities.
3 Therefore, it is important to 
distinguish between availability and accessibility when assessing the impact of decentralization on 
inequality. 
Positive spatial correlation of public-good investments in a region, generated from the spatial 
complementarities (as discussed in Appendix A), may induce multiple equilibria (one of which could be 
poverty trap). In this case, local inequality may not increase through decentralization since public-good 
investments are positively correlated among communities. 
Third, note that in Section 2.3, we discussed centralized coordination in which the central 
authority decides resource allocation across communities. This is one form of cross-community 
coordination. In Section 2.2, we discussed the possibility of noncentralized coordination in a 
noncooperative game setting. Empirically we also cannot identify the funding source of public 
investments but can only observe changes in public infrastructure. Although the interpretation of 
coordinated investments differs between the above two stories, we have to set this issue aside as a 
possible limitation in our empirical work. 
 
 
                                                 
3 However, we do not have data on time costs required to reach the nearest public good in some other 
communities.   10
3.  EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
To assess community-level public-good dynamics, we use a nonparametric approach, and a local 
polynomial smoothing estimation. This approach is flexible to capture (possibly non-linear) relationships 
between current community-level public good or accessibility and the next period.  
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the possibilities of multiple equilibria: poverty trap, threshold, and 
stable high-level equilibrium. Figures 1a and 1b show the dynamics of public good availability, for 
example, the number of facilities per capita. Given the initial level, the number of facilities per capita will 
increase (decrease) if the dynamic curve is above (below) the 45 degree line. Figure 1a describes 
convergence to a low-level x* (poverty trap). In contrast, Figure 1b shows sustainable growth in xt if the 
initial level is above the threshold. 
Accessibility is measured and interpreted in a different way. We show distance to the nearest 
facility outside the community if there is no facility in the community. Since a long distance means that 
the facility is not easily accessible, the area below the 45-degree line (that is the distance is getting shorter 
over time) implies convergence. Figure 2a shows a possibility that intercommunity inequality becomes 
larger over time. Remote areas are neglected in this case. Figure 2b describes intercommunity 
convergence.  
Note that in the analysis of distance (accessibility), we only examine villages with no facility, that 
is, those villages that are underdeveloped in the sense that they have no public infrastructure in the initial 
condition. 
Coordination success and failure also correspond to the above figures. If public goods are 
allocated effectively over space (across communities), they should improve accessibility in neighboring 
communities too. Such coordination can fail when spatial allocation is not well designed. In the period of 
decentralization, if neighboring communities do not coordinate among themselves, it may increase 
inequality in accessibility. 
In decentralization, however, we have a more fundamental prediction, that is, low-income (low-
endowment) communities suffer from a lack of resources to invest in public goods. Thus, we predict that 
divergence patterns are more likely to be observed in decentralization that lacks the coordination of the 
central or local governments. 
The above method potentially fails to capture spatial variations in the timings of decentralization 
implementation, and to differentiate cases by the length of period exposed in the decentralization process. 
As discussed in the introduction, this paper does not attempt to strictly compare centralized and 
decentralized regimes.    11
Figure 1. Per-capita availability 
Figure 1a.  Figure 1b. 
 
 
Figure 2. Accessibility 
 
Figure 2a.  Figure 2b. 
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4.  DATA 
We use the Indonesian village census (PODES) for 2000 and 2006. Each round covered all villages in the 
country, collecting information on various village characteristics. We matched the 2000 and 2006 rounds 
by village, (1) recovering provinces, districts, and subdistricts from codes that have changed from round 
to round; (2) sorting out merge and split patterns at the subdistrict level, and (3) constructing unique 
codes for these administrative units. At the village level, we used village names to match, so where 
village names changed, some observations were missed (along with their splits). During this process 
about 80.7 percent of the 2000 villages were merged between 2000 and 2006, based on the 2000 village 
sample. 
The village census collects detailed information on education and public-health facilities in all 
rounds. On education, it asks how many schools there are of different types (primary, junior secondary, 
senior secondary, and higher), which are public or private, and the distance to the nearest school if the 
village has no school. On health facility, it collects information on the number of different types of health 
facility (hospital, maternity house, medical clinic [poliklinik], community health center [puskesmas], and 
so on) and the distance to the nearest health facility if the village has none itself. 
In the analysis, we use the per-capita number of facility and the distance to the nearest facility to 
measure the availability and accessibility of education and health public goods (services), respectively. 
Note that the per-capita number of facilities may change because of population mobility, even if the 
absolute number of facilities does not change. 
It is important to note that the capacities of schools and health facilities could be different across 
villages. For example, even if the per-capita number of schools is low, those schools could themselves be 
large. However, the situation in many villages is different from that of towns and cities, in that schools are 
usually small in rural areas. It is also important to note that high schools are, on average, larger than 
primary schools. In the nonparametric analysis below, therefore, we have to allow certain errors in the 
measurement of per-capita facility availability. 
Distance to the nearest facility (if the village has no facility) can measure the accessibility to 
public goods as well as intercommunity coordination success and failure. Allocation in other villages 
changes the distance, so the spatial distribution of public goods (services) could have implications for 
accessibility.   13
5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section reports empirical findings on education and health facilities during the 2000–2006 period. 
The analysis investigates dynamic changes in (1) accessibility and (2) within-village availability of these 
facilities in the decentralization period. We cover all provinces in Indonesia, which provides sufficient 
variations in local endowment and economic conditions.  
5.1 Schools 
5.1.1 Accessibility: Underdeveloped villages 
We report nonparametric regression results on the village dynamics of education public goods. The 
analysis examines dynamic changes in the access (distance) to the nearest primary school, junior high 
school, and senior high school among villages without schools.  
In the analysis of distance to the nearest school, 6 and 50 kilometers were chosen as the 
maximum distance to primary and high schools, respectively, after carefully examining the skewed 
distributions (see Appendix B Tables B.1 to B.3 for the number of schools and percentage distributions). 
Figure 3 depicts the dynamic changes in the distance to the nearest primary school. Generally, 
accessibility dynamics show convergence patterns. Convergence seems to be quite visible for villages in 
terms of distance to the nearest school. 
Figure 3. Dynamics: Distance to primary school, 2000-2006 
 
However, caution must be exercised in generalizing this finding, as the sample we used in this 
analysis is only about 8 percent of the total villages. In other words, more than 90 percent of villages have 
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Figure 4 shows dynamic changes in the distance from the village to the nearest junior high 
school. The curve has shifted downward. The convergence pattern is steady through decentralization, 
which appears to be against our initial prediction. It seems that the incentive to secure the accessibility of 
education has been strengthened. In other words, coordination appears to be quite successful even in the 
decentralization period. 
Figure 4. Dynamics: Distance to junior high school, 2000-2006 
 
Dynamic change in the distance to the nearest senior high school from the village is shown in 
Figure 5. The previous finding becomes even clearer in this case. The concavity of this dynamic 
correspondence implies that distance is converging to zero 
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5.1.2 Availability: More developed villages 
Next we analyze the availability of school capital in the village, by computing per capita number of 
schools (that is, number of schools divided by village population). Figure 6 shows changes in the per 
capita availability of public primary schools. The graph indicates a convergence pattern in which the per 
capita number is moving toward an equilibrium level. There is a similar finding in Figures 7 and 8, which 
show the dynamics of public junior and senior secondary schools. 
Figure 6. Dynamics: Number of primary schools, 2000-2006 
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Figure 8. Dynamics: Number of senior high schools, 2000-2006 
 
All these graphs demonstrate convergence to a low-level state. This is possible when populations 
endogenously move toward better communities or better-off communities have higher population growth, 
unless schools were destroyed in natural disasters. 
Dynamics in accessibility shows convergence to a more equal and better situation (that is, 
building new schools in relatively remote areas), whereas dynamics in availability exhibits convergence 
to a more equal but a low-level state, the so-called poverty trap. Even though spatial allocation seems to 
become more equal, endogenous population mobility or population growth seems to worsen the 
distribution, measured by per-capita number of school facilities in the village. In Section 6, we show 
some evidence to support this hypothesis. 
5.2 Health Facilities 
In this section, we illustrate the dynamics of health-facility public goods during the decentralization 
period. For this purpose we have chosen “distance to the nearest hospital” to investigate the accessibility 
and the per capita number of puskesmas (health centers) (both integrated health centers and 
supported/small puskesmas). In 2000, most villages had no hospital,
4 and nearly 40 percent of villages 
had at least one puskesmas. The maximum distance to a hospital in the following analysis is set at 70 
kilometers. 
Figure 9 shows dynamic changes in accessibility to a hospital in the decentralization period 
(2000-2006), which supports convergence toward a more equal spatial distribution.
                                                 
4 In the 1996 PODES, the information on distance is only available for hospitals, thus we cannot analyze changes in distance 
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Figure 9. Dynamics: Distance to hospital, 2000-2006 
 
The dynamics of the per capita availability of puskesmas is investigated in Figure 10. Although 
unstable curves (zig-zags) show up among villages with relatively large per capita numbers of puskesmas, 
the curves are located a little below the 45-degree line, which implies convergence to a low-level 
equilibrium over time. 
Figure 10. Number of puskesmas, 2000-2006 
 
As observed with the education figures, we see a qualitative difference between health facility 
availability and accessibility. Dynamics in accessibility show convergence to a situation with more equal 
accessibility, whereas dynamics in availability show convergence to a more equal but worse-off situation 
(poverty trap). Even though spatial allocation seems to be getting more equal, endogenous population 
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5.3 Java and Non-Java 
We also investigated dynamic patterns on the island of Java: Jakarta, West Java, Banten, Central Java, 
Yogyakarta, and East Java provinces. This region is thought to be more developed than the other regions 
in terms of economic activity and accessibility/availability of public infrastructure such as school and 
health facilities. Another clear characteristic of this island is a high population density, which, on average, 
decreases per-capita availability of school and health facilities. 
Briefly, first, in general, the accessibility dynamics are faster in Java. Second, the per capita 
availability is, on average, much lower in Java than in the other regions because of the high population 
density in Java, but we do not observe significant differences in the dynamic changes between Java and 
non-Java regions.   19
6.  POPULATION GROWTH: IS THIS A KEY? 
In this section we show some evidence about population growth in the period 2000–2006. Our 
nonparametric analysis in the previous sections demonstrated that the per-capita availability of school and 
health facilities has been deteriorating in general, except in some very disadvantaged areas. This finding 
contrasts with our findings on the dynamics of spatial accessibility, which shows that in villages with no 
school or health facility, the average distance to the nearest school and/or health facility has decreased 
over time. 
To explain this gap, our conjecture rests on population dynamics. If population grows faster—
either through natural growth or movement into areas endowed with more facilities than others—it is 
possible that the per capita measure of facility availability could worsen. In other words, local population 
is endogenously responding to infrastructure (in this paper, school and health facilities) to crowd it out. 
Table 1 shows regression results using the PODES data in 2000 and 2006. We include district-
level fixed effects to control local trends in population growth as well as facility availability. In other 
words, we suppose that population is moving across villages within a district. This procedure also 
controls region-specific natural population growth. Interestingly, population growth is significantly and 
positively responding to three out of four infrastructure measures: junior high schools, senior high 
schools, and puskesmas. Since we controlled the district-level average changes, we can interpret this 
result as showing that population is moving from less-endowed to well-endowed villages. In particular, 
the effect of senior high schools is large. 
Table 1. Population growth against the initial infrastructure condition 







school  Puskesmas 
Infrastructure – Per-capita numbers in 2000  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Infrastructure variable  5.9095  15.168  31.775  12.947 
 (1.33)  (3.38)  (4.02)  (3.04) 
District fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  55,495  55,495  55,495  55,495 
R-squared (within)  0.0013  0.0003  0.0004  0.0004 
Note:  The numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values, using robust standard errors with district clusters.   20
7. CONCLUSION 
We showed that accessibility to school has been improving among villages without schools. This trend is 
steady through decentralization in the spatial allocation of primary, junior, and senior high schools, but 
weaker in the hospital allocation. 
However, the dynamics of per capita facility availability demonstrates the convergence to a low-
level equilibrium. Among villages with school and health facilities, the per-capita number has been 
decreasing, probably due to the dynamic mobility of the population toward better-off communities. 
This contrast, shown in the above two dimensions, may suggest that the spatial allocation of these 
public goods appears to be coordinated during the decentralization period but the endogenous mobility of 
population partially cancels out the benefits from this coordination effort. Policy attention is required to 
this point.   21
APPENDIX A 
Public goods in a region can be not only substitutable but also complementary in a different context. A 
typical example is road construction. If a road is not connected to roads in the neighboring villages, 
economic returns are small. 
A similar point is true also in education and health. In education, for example, building new 
schools in neighboring communities makes existing schools less crowded, which improves the quality of 
and increases returns to schooling. Second, the availability of schools at the secondary level is likely to 
improve the progression rate from the primary to secondary levels among children in the community. The 
first point is also relevant to health facilities. 
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Under the above condition, a sufficiently small Q likely reduces the individually most-preferred tax rate, 
since the marginal rate of substitution becomes large. Reaction function is defined as 
() ( ) ( )
m
kk k k qQ Ey ty Q −− = ,.  
If G(Q) and G
′(Q) are both near zero for sufficiently small Q (that is, local convexity) and the marginal 
utility is bounded from below, 
(0 ) 0
m
k ty, = , 
that is, communities can be stagnant in poverty-trap Nash equilibrium.   22
It is interesting to point out that substitutability and complementarity imply observationally 
distinct predictions. With substitutability, more infrastructure in neighboring communities leads to less 
investment in the community. With complementarity, it is opposite: more infrastructure in the 
neighborhood leads to more investment in the community.   23
APPENDIX B:  TABLES 
Table B.1. Distance to the nearest primary school, 2000-2006 (kilometers) 
  Year 2006 
Year 2000  0  0 < x < 2  2 <= x < 4  4 <= x < 6  Total 
0 49,538  418  158  63  50,177 
 (98.73)  (0.83)  (0.31)  (0.13)  (100.00) 
0 < x < 2  535  2,246  394  73  3,248 
 (16.47)  (69.15)  (12.13)  (2.25)  (100.00) 
2 <= x < 4  176  378  393  61  1,008 
 (17.46)  (37.50)  (38.99)  (6.05)  (100.00) 
4 <= x < 6  86  67  63  67  283 
 (30.39)  (23.67)  (22.26)  (23.67)  (100.00) 
Total 50,335  3,109  1,008  264  54,716 
 (91.99)  (5.68)  (1.84)  (0.48)  (100.00) 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are row percentages. 
Table B.2. Distance to the nearest junior secondary school, 2000-2006 (kilometers) 
 Year  2006 
Year 2000  0  0 < x < 10  10 <= x < 20  20 <= x < 30  30 <= x < 40  40 <= x < 50  Total 
0 15,570  1,559  135  38  16 7  17,325 
  (89.87)  (9.00)  (0.78) (0.22) (0.09) (0.04)  (100.00) 
0 < x < 10  2,865  26,667  1,033  140  51  25  30,781 
  (9.31)  (86.63)  (3.36) (0.45) (0.17) (0.08)  (100.00) 
10 <= x < 20  514  1,590  1,507  198  49  35  3,893 
 (13.20)  (40.84)  (38.71)  (5.09)  (1.29)  (0.90)  (100.00) 
20 <= x < 30  153  289  263  295  88  36  1,124 
  (13.61)  (25.71)  (23.40) (26.25) (26.25)  (7.83)  (100.00) 
30 <= x < 40  65  119  96  66  139  27  512 
  (12.70)  (23.24)  (18.75) (12.89) (27.15)  (5.27)  (100.00) 
40 <= x < 50  51  54  69  43  37  69  323 
  (15.79)  (16.72)  (21.36) (13.31) (11.46) (21.36)  (100.00) 
Total 19,218  20,278  3,103  780  380  199  53,958 
  (35.62)  (56.11)  (5.75) (1.45) (0.70) (0.37)  (100.00) 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are row percentages.   24
Table B.3. Distance to the nearest senior secondary school, 2000-2006 (kilometers) 
 Year  2006 
Year 2000  0  0 < x < 10  10 <= x < 20  20 <= x < 30  30 <= x < 40  40 <= x < 50  Total 
0 5,641  1,490  121  19  13  2  7,286 
  (77.42)  (20.45)  (1.66) (0.26) (0.18) (0.03)  (100.00) 
0 < x < 10  1,632  25,529  1,957  239  82  41  29,480 
  (5.56)  (86.60)  (6.64) (0.81) (0.28) (0.14)  (100.00) 
10 <= x < 20  484  3,119  4,467  557  111  57  8,795 
  (5.50)  (35.46)  (50.79)  (6.33) (1.26) (0.65)  (100.00) 
20 <=x < 30  197  799  826  1,094  247  73  3,236 
 (6.09)  (24.69)  (25.53)  (33.81)  (7.63)  (2.26)  (100.00) 
30 <= x < 40  95  365  283  260  402  98  1,503 
  (6.32)  (24.28)  (18.83) (17.30) (26.75)  (6.52)  (100.00) 
40 <= x < 50  64  177  145  122  126  221  855 
  (7.49)  (20.70)  (16.96) (14.27) (14.74) (25.85)  (100.00) 
Total 8,113  31,479  7,799  2,291 981 492  51,155 
  (15.86)  (61.54)  (15.25)  (4.48) (1.92) (0.96)  (100.00) 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are row percentages. 
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